Abstract. Consider a game with a continuum of players where only a finite number of them are atomic. Objective functions and admissible strategies may depend on the actions chosen by atomic players and on aggregate information about the actions chosen by non-atomic players.
Introduction
In a seminal paper, Schmeidler (1973) proved that in non-convex games with a continuum of players the set of pure strategy equilibria is non-empty provided that (i) all agents are non-atomic, and (ii) objective functions depends only on their own strategy and on the average of the actions chosen by the other players. Essentially, this last assumption convexify the game, because the integral of any correspondence is a convex set (Aumann (1964) ).
In this paper, we extend Schmeidler's result to large generalized games with a finite number of atomic players. In our framework, both objective functions and admissible strategies may depend on the strategies of atomic players and on messages which aggregate information about strategies chosen by non-atomic players (i.e., not necessarily on the average of these actions). By extending the proof given by Rath (1992, Theorem 2) of Schmeidler (1973) classical result, we provide a short and direct proof of the existence of a pure Nash equilibria in our generalized game, without need to purify a mixed strategy equilibrium. Our theorem is a special case of Balder (1999, Theorem 2.1) but his prove use extensively functional analysis. Thus, one of the merits of our proof is its simplicity, because it is based only on standard fixed point arguments and finite dimensional real analysis. Furthermore, our theorem is general enough to cope with interesting applications.
A natural application of our result is to general equilibrium theory. Essentially, to prove equilibrium existence it is usual to find bounds on endogenous variables and search an equilibrium allocation as an equilibrium in an abstract generalized game. In this type of generalized game, consumers and firms maximize their objective functions taking prices as given, and there are atomic players that determine prices, asset returns, taxes or any other endogenous variable that are taken as given by consumers or firms. Thus, for equilibrium models where agents have non-convex choice sets or their objective function are not necessarily quasi-concave, our main result may help researcher to find an equilibrium.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: in Section 2 we present our non-convex large generalized game and we prove the existence of a pure strategy Nash equilibrium. In Section 3, we discuss the relation to the existing literature.
2. Pure strategy equilibria in a non-convex generalized game Let G(T, (K t , Γ t , u t ) t∈T , h) be a generalized game with an infinite set of players T = T 1 ∪ T 2 , where T 1 ⊂ R is a compact finite measure continuum set of non-atomic players with respect to Lebesgue measure λ, 1 and T 2 is a finite set of atomic players. Each player t ∈ T 1 has a compact and non-empty action space K t ⊂ K, where K ⊂ R n is a compact set and t∈T1 K t = ∅. On the other hand, each player t ∈ T 2 has a compact, convex and non-empty action space K t ⊂ R nt , with A profile of actions for players in T 1 is given by a function f :
any t ∈ T 1 . Since T 2 is finite, a profile of actions for the players in T 2 is a vector a := (a i ; i ∈ T 2 ) ∈ Π t∈T2 R nt such that a t ∈ K t , for any t ∈ T 2 . Let F(T i ) be the space of all profiles of actions of agents in T i , with i ∈ {0, 1}. Also, given t ∈ T 2 , let F −t (T 2 ) be the set of profiles a −t := (a j ; j ∈ T 2 \ {t})
of actions take by players j ∈ T 2 \ {t}.
In G(T, (K t , Γ t , u t ) t∈T , h) players do not necessarily advance the actions chosen by players in T 1 or, alternatively, players do not necessarily take into account the actions of each non-atomic player to determine an optimal response. However, players will considerate, at the moment in which they make a decision, aggregated information of some characteristics of these actions. Formally, if agents t ∈ T 1 choose a profile of actions f ∈ F(T 1 ), then we assume that the relevant characteristics of this actions are coded by a continuous function h :
Furthermore, each player in T will only take into account, for strategic purposes, aggregated information about these available
Since we want to concentrate in actions profiles for which messages are well defined, we say that f is a strategic profile of players in T 1 if both f ∈ F(T 1 ) and h(·, f (·)) is a measurable function from
3 Measurability restrictions are not necessary over the behavior of atomic players. For this reason, the set of strategic profiles of players in T 2 coincides with the space of profiles of actions
The set of messages associated to strategic profiles of non-atomic players is given by
which is non-empty since t∈T1 K t is a non-empty set and h is a continuous function. Also, since the sets K and T 1 are compact, for any profile of actions f :
is bounded. Thus, if it is measurable then it is integrable. For these reason, in the definition of the set of messages M we only require measurability of h(·, f (·)).
In our game, the messages about the strategic profiles of players in T 1 jointly with the strategic profiles of players in T 2 may restrict the set of admissible strategies available for a player t ∈ T .
That is, given a vector (m, a) ∈ M × F(T 2 ) the strategies available for a player t ∈ T 1 are given by a
K t is a continuous correspondence with non-empty and compact values. Analogously, given (m, a −t ) ∈ M × F −t (T 2 ), the set of strategies available for a
K t is a continuous correspondence with non-empty, compact and convex values. We refer to correspondences (Γ t ; t ∈ T ) as correspondences of admissible strategies.
Given a set A ⊂ R k , let U(A) be the collection of continuous functions u : A → R. Assume that U(A) is endowed with the sup norm topology. We suppose that each player t ∈ T 1 has an objective function u t ∈ U( K × M × F(T 2 )) and each player t ∈ T 2 has an objective function u t ∈ U(M × F(T 2 )) which we assume is quasi-concave in its own strategy. Finally, we assume that 3 In Schmeidler (1973) and Rath (1992) , players are non-atomic and take into account only the average of actions chosen by the others players. Thus, following our notation, l = n and h(t, x) = x. Therefore, they define strategic profiles as measurable functions from the set of players to the set of actions.
the mapping U :
Definition. A pure strategy Nash equilibrium of the generalized game G(T,
given by strategic profiles (f * , (a * t ; t ∈ T 2 )) such that, for any non-atomic player t ∈ T 1 ,
and for any atomic player
, where the message m(f * ) := T1 h(t, f * (t))dλ belongs on the set M .
Note that, in our definition of Nash equilibrium, every agent maximize his objective function, while in Balder (1999) and Rath (1992) in equilibrium almost everyone maximizes. However, since objective functions are continuous and action spaces compact, given an equilibrium for any of the games studied in these articles, it is always possible to change the allocations associated to the set of non-atomic players that do not maximizes, give to each of them an optimal plan, without changing the integrability of the action profile or the value of messages. Thus, Theorem 2 in Rath (1992) and Theorem 2.1 in Balder (1999) assure the existence of Nash equilibria where each player maximize.
Theorem. Consider a generalized game G(T, (K t , Γ t , u t ) t∈T , h) where,
(1) The set of players is T 1 ∪ T 2 , where T 1 is a compact finite measure set of non-atomic players and T 2 is a finite set of atomic players.
(2) For any t ∈ T, action spaces K t are non-empty and compact, correspondences of admissible strategies Γ t are continuous and have non-empty and compact values, and objective functions u t are continuous.
(3) Each atomic player has a convex set of actions, a convex-valued correspondence of admissible strategies, and an objective function which is quasi-concave on its own strategy.
(4) There exists a compact set K such that, for any t ∈ T 1 , K t ⊂ K and ∩ t∈T1 K t is non-empty.
(5) The function h :
, which associates with any t ∈ T 1 the objective function u t , is measurable.
Then, there exists a pure strategy Nash equilibrium.
Proof. We divide the proof in five steps.
(1) The space of messages M ⊂ R l is non-empty, compact and convex .
As we remark in the previous section, M is non-empty as a consequence of the fact that t∈T1 K t = ∅. Essentially, if we fix k ∈ t∈T1 K t , the function g : T 1 → K defined by g(t) = k for any t ∈ T 1 belongs to F(T 1 ) and h(·, g(·)) is trivially measurable. Therefore, T1 h(t, g(t))dλ is well defined and M is a non-empty subset of R l .
The set M is convex because the integral of a correspondence in a non-atomic measurable space is a convex set (see Aumann (1964) ): consider the correspondence Q :
Q(t)dλ and, therefore, M is convex.
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Let Q : T 1 R l be the correspondence defined by Q(t) = h(T 1 , K), for any t ∈ T 1 . Then
Therefore, since h is continuous, M is a subset of a compact set. Thus, it remains to prove that M is closed. Let {m k } k∈N ⊂ M be a sequence that converges to a vector m ∈ R l . Since
which is a compact set. Thus, every limit point of {h k (t)} k∈N is contained in Q(t). Also, since h is continuous, T 1 is compact and ∪ t∈T1 K t ⊂ K, it is easy to see that {h k } k∈N is uniformly bounded by an integrable function. By Aumann (1976) , it follows that the limit point of
Therefore, the space of messages is compact.
(2) Best-reply correspondences are closed with non-empty and compact values.
For any t ∈ T 1 , define the best-reply correspondence
Analogously, for any atomic player t ∈ T 2 the best-reply correspondence
It follows that, under conditions of item (i) in the statement of the Theorem, and as a consequence of the Berge's Maximum Theorem, best-reply correspondences have closed graph and non-empty compact values.
(3) For any atomic player t ∈ T 2 , his best-reply correspondence has convex values.
A direct consequence of item (ii) in the statement of the Theorem.
and has non-empty and convex values.
Given (m, a) ∈ M × F(T 2 ), and by an identical argument to those made by Rath (1992 , pages 430-431), there exists a measurable function f ∈ F(T 1 ) such that f (t) ∈ B t (m, a) for any t ∈ T 1 .
Thus, since h is continuous, h(·, f (·)) is measurable and, therefore, Ω has non-empty values.
The correspondence Ω has convex values, since for any (m, a) ∈ M × F(T 2 ), the set Ω(m, a) is the integral of the correspondence t h(t, B t (m, a)).
Since for any t ∈ T 1 , the best-reply correspondence B t has closed graph, for any t ∈ T 1 the correspondence that associate to each (m, a) ∈ M × F(T 2 ) the set h(t, B t (m, a)) has also closed graph (a direct consequence of the continuity of the function h and the fact that B t (m, a) ⊂ K for any (t, m, a) ∈ T 1 × M × F(T 2 )). On the other hand, since T 1 and K are compact and h continuous, there exists a bounded function v :
any t ∈ T 1 , f ∈ F(T 1 ) and T1 v(t)dλ is finite. Therefore, the correspondence that associate to each (m, a) ∈ M × F(T 2 ) the integral on T 1 of the correspondence t h(t, B t (m, a)) has closed graph (a consequence of the main result in Aumann (1976) ). In other words, Ω is closed.
(5) The generalized game G(T, (K t , Γ t , u t ) t∈T , h) has a pure strategy Nash equilibrium.
Define the correspondence Γ :
Then Γ is closed and has nonempty, convex and compact values. Therefore, applying Kakutani's Fixed Point Theorem, we conclude that Γ has a fixed point, i.e. there exists (m * , a
Thus, for some f * ∈ F(T 1 ), m * = T1 h(t, f * (t))dλ and f * (t) ∈ B t (m * , a * ), for any t ∈ T 1 . Also, for any t ∈ T 2 , a * t ∈ B t (m * , a * −t ). These properties assure that (f * , a * ) constitutes a pure strategy Nash equilibrium of the generalized game. There are generalizations of our theorem that are quite straightforward but we think they would obscure the elementary nature of our prove. For example, we could avoid assuming actions spaces share a common action for every agent (i.e., t∈T1 K t = ∅) and rather use an argument along Remark 8 in Rath (1992, page 432) . Similar arguments to Remark 6 in Rath's article would allow us to avoid fixing a topology in U( K × M × F(T 2 )). On the other hand, we could also relax substantially the hypothesis of our coding function h. In particular, as in Balder (1999), we could assume that h is a vector valued function of Carathéodory functions.
Finally, we should stress that the most important difference of our theorem with Balder's Theorem 2.1 is the fact that we assume sets of strategic profiles to be integrable bounded codifications of actions profiles (i.e., are integrable functions-obtained by the codification of actions profiles-with respect to a finite measure space). Integrability of action profiles is something which is clearly an ungrounded hypothesis in many applications making necessary to bound actions, prove equilibrium existence and arguing somehow that bound are innocuous (for example, by constructing a sequence of equilibriums for less stringent bounds and then arguing that this sequence has a convergent subsequence that is also an equilibrium).
